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Introduction 
There are great expectations in the UK for infrastructure and its role in delivering for 
customers and society, promoting efficiency and economic growth.  These 
expectations are matched by an ambitious forward programme of investments in 
renewal and expansion of network capacity and quality across sectors, in some cases 
backed by the government and in others by private investors. Economic regulation 
and competition have a big role to play in aligning the interests of investors with the 
interests of customers and society.  Specifically, in relation to investors, economic 
regulation and competition help to ensure investment is efficient, with the right 
investment taking place the right place, at the right time and at efficient cost. In this 
context, regulatory coherence and stability has rarely been so important.      
                                                          
1 Richard Price is Chief Executive of the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) and Chair of the UK 
Regulators’ Network; and Cathryn Ross is Chief Executive of the Office of Water Services 
(Ofwat).  
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October 2014. 
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In this paper we discuss  
• the relationship between competition and regulation, and the way regulators 
use their powers;   
• the importance of independent regulation in helping to ensure the delivery of 
what customers and society need, want and can afford from regulated sectors, 
particularly against a background of major investments in UK infrastructure;  
• how economic regulation needs to learn and evolve if it is to continue to help 
ensure delivery of what customers and society expect, given that regulated 
sectors and the environment in which they operate change over time; and 
• how the regulators are working together to maximise the benefits from 
coordination or read across between sectors.   
 
What has been the impact of economic regulation?  
First, it’s worth remembering that economic regulation has achieved a lot over the 
period since privatisation. Across regulated sectors, the UK’s approach to 
independent economic regulation has spurred efficiencies and helped to deliver a 
step-change in the consumer experience and, linked to this.  Linked to this, 
independent regulators have facilitated massive investment programmes at relatively 
low costs of capital, reflecting the stability, predictability and long term view they 
provide.  We have seen substantial gains for consumers in all regulated markets – 
whether substantially liberalised or still price-cap regulated.  
• Since privatisation in 1989, the water sector has attracted £116 billion of 
investment, delivering greatly improved infrastructure and services to customers 
at no cost to taxpayers. Bills are around one-third lower as a result of Ofwat’s 
efficiency challenge, and have been constant since 2009. 2 
 
• Regulation of the communications sector has driven strong competition, 
innovation and investment, which have transformed the economy and our daily 
lives. Mobile and broadband services are now ubiquitous and constantly improving 
in terms of speed, capability and the range of services available to consumers - yet 
the average family in the UK is spending less now on these services than it did a 
decade ago and is paying less than families in other leading developed economies.  
 
• In the first 15 years after energy privatisation, regulation led to a halving in the 
cost of network charges for delivering energy to consumers, and over the next 8 
years will enable a 50 per cent increase in investment at a lower cost of capital.  
Ofgem’s retail market reforms will intensify competition, and the recently 
announced referral of energy markets by Ofgem to the CMA will consider whether 
                                                          
2 See chart 1, at end.  
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further remedies are needed to remove barriers to competition.  Britain’s energy 
system is more secure, sustainable and reliable and, at a time of rising energy 
costs, prices remain below the average faced by consumers across Europe.  
 
• Economic regulation has supported transformation in the airport sector.  It has 
created enormous choice and value for passengers by supporting the development 
of competition and the expansion of regional airports.  It has underpinned £11bn 
of investment in world class facilities during the last decade that have transformed 
the global reputation and perception of Heathrow.  
 
• In rail, regulation has driven down the day-to-day cost of rail infrastructure by 40 
per cent over the last decade, with a further 19 per cent to come over the next five 
years, freeing up resources for investment in a better network.3  It has set 
stretching targets for punctuality which have underpinned sustained growth in 
demand – with a doubling of passenger kilometres and a 25 per cent growth in 
freight volumes since privatisation in 1997; record levels of customer satisfaction; 
and a recent safety record among the best in Europe.  
 
It is fair to say that more and better ex-post evaluation would help us to establish how 
these benefits were achieved, what represents best practice, and whether even more 
could have been achieved with different judgements or levers.  We believe that this is 
an area in which both regulators and the research community could do more.  
The UK model is held in high regard and copied in other countries and is recognised 
as a positive model for reconciling the interests of consumers with those of investors 
while preserving dynamic incentives to efficiency.   
We are also seeing the extension of parts of the economic regulation toolkit and 
consumer empowerment to some public services, without privatisation – notably 
health services and –under legislation currently proposed – England’s strategic road 
network.  
  
                                                          
3 See chart 2, at end.  
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Whatever happened to the ‘withering on the vine’ of 
economic regulation as competition law and ‘normal 
markets’ took over?  
A lot has been delivered since privatisation. But one major expectation has not 
happened.  Regulation has not withered on the vine in all sectors.4   
• In water there have been challenges in extending competition – for example, , 
while  the new appointments regime allows for ‘competition for the market’ it still 
replaces one monopoly at the retail level with another, and the Water Supply 
Licensing regime introduced in the Water Act 2003 only allows the very largest 
business customers to switch supplier and few have done so;  
• in energy markets there has been dissatisfaction with the results of market 
liberalisation and especially about the benefits delivered for consumers: Ofgem 
recently referred the whole energy market to the CMA; 5   
• in rail, the structural and financing responses to the post-Hatfield crisis have 
weakened incentives on the incumbent infrastructure monopolist to perform for 
its customers; and like the market for passenger rail services, it is prone to 
intervention by civil servants;  
• in health – we are only starting to see the impact of a form of regulation 
compelling the commissioners of NHS-funded services to think hard about 
consumer benefits first. But Monitor – and beyond Monitor the competition 
regime – is starting to focus minds;   
• meanwhile there have been more successful, structural interventions and 
deregulatory moves in airports; while in communications liberalisation and  
technological change have transformed the market and people’s everyday 
experiences.  
                                                          
4 As illustrated in chart 4. 
5 Ofgem referred the energy market to the CMA for a full competition investigation on 26 June 
2014, expecting that the CMA would examine among other things the relationship between 
the supply businesses and generation arms of the six largest suppliers barriers to entry and 
expansion for suppliers; the profitability of the six largest suppliers; whether or not there is 
sufficient competition between the large energy suppliers; the trend of suppliers consistently 
setting higher prices for consumers who have not switched; and low consumer engagement 
that contributes to weak competitive pressure in the market.  
See Ofgem announcement: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/press-releases/ofgem-refers-energy-
market-full-competition-investigation  
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Why have we seen so many regulated sectors remaining with relatively little 
competition being introduced?  There are several possible explanations. 
Even recognising that there are good reasons why competition has taken hold more 
fully across regulated sectors, regulators have recently been challenged - by 
government and commentators – on why we have not made more use of our powers 
under competition law.   There are a number of possible explanations.   
First, we don’t see “lazy old regulators” simply not doing the work on competition and 
structural issues because it’s too difficult, or likely to be tough to explain and a battle 
to achieve.  On the contrary we see regulators trying to confront difficult issues in 
different sectors –where progress often requires interventions and conversations over 
time.  All regulators spend time considering whether we have the right balance across 
the levers that we use.   We think a lot about the balance between on the one hand 
the use of ex-ante regulatory levers - which can be complex and intrusive but often 
yield rapid and visible improvements for consumers; and on the other, the use of 
competition powers and structural reforms which might lead to market solutions in 
the longer term, and significantly reduce the scope and intrusiveness of regulation.   
We don’t see much evidence of capture or cosiness either - though of course, when 
parts of your workforce as a regulator are embroiled in the day-to-day interactions 
with regulated companies, this is always something the needs to be guarded against.   
Beyond this, in the grind of day-to-day regulation, such as monitoring and holding to 
account, you need to make sure that you give enough focus and attention to the big 
issues for customers, society and the economy, now and over the long term.  You have 
to challenge yourself constantly about whether you are really putting most effort 
where it will deliver most value.      
That can be hard – and it is harder when regulators face multiple objectives or take on 
functions which are not central to their task, or which risk compromising their 
independence of government. Some see this as paralleling what we ask regulatees to 
do – we are ‘playing to our USP’ and ‘growing the business’.  But another way of 
looking at this is what the Institute for Government calls the ‘Christmas tree quango’ - 
taking on incremental function by incremental function.  We need to remember that 
we are not ‘growing businesses’.  We are independent statutory bodies with duties, 
among other things, to improve the lot of consumers and business users.  When 
considering our functions we need to keep clearly in mind the need to sustain and 
improve the integrity, focus and expertise which allows us to act firmly in consumers’ 
interests now and in the long term.  
We not only have statutory duties but statutory powers, and we consider carefully 
when, where and how to use the different levers available to us.  In particular, we 
challenge ourselves as to whether we have the right balance between our use of 
competition powers and those powers available to us under the sectoral regulatory 
6 
 
framework.  Regulators have generally taken fewer cases under the 1998 Competition 
Act (CA98) than the competition authorities – though there have been several.  If on 
the other hand you look at the crude numbers of market studies over the last decade6  
since 2005, the numbers initiated by sectoral regulator are around one-quarter of the 
numbers undertaken by the Office of Fair Trading, across all markets and the entire 
economy.  This is proportionately not far out of line.  So it is not clear that regulators 
have shied away from the use of competition powers compared with other sectors. 
The use of regulatory measures is not always wrong-headed from the perspective of 
consumer outcomes: far from it. Regulatory and ex-ante levers can often get surer, 
quicker benefits for consumers – indeed the OFT’s use of  commitments and the 
Competition Commission’s use of behavioural remedies shows that the use of ex ante 
solutions is not limited to regulated sectors.7  Further, ex ante powers – used pro-
competitively – can also be the best way of introducing and embedding competition in 
markets that have historically been monopolistic.  And as we are all under pressure to 
demonstrate value for money and improve efficiency, our choices will also be affected 
by the resource implications associated with different levers.  We are constantly 
looking for the most efficient and effective tools to solve the given problem, while 
recognising that using some levers – such as those available under competition law – 
also bring wider benefits for the regime as a whole.   
It is fair to say, and perhaps obvious, that just as the stance of regulators varies across 
sectors in respect of the use of their competition powers, so too the role and approach 
of government varies enormously across sectors. That variation reflects in part the 
different structural circumstances of each sector; in part it reflects intertwining goals 
of promoting economic growth, the interests of consumers, and other policy 
objectives.  It can reflect the financial exposure of government departments, and the 
amounts of public money at stake in sectors such as transport and health. And 
sometimes it reflects different departments’ stances on structural issues - from pro-
competition to less so. There are very significant variations in approach between 
departments.  
So there are significant differences between sectors – in approach, in underlying 
economics, in market structure, in conduct and in technology, as well as in the 
legislative and policy framework.   These help to explain the variation in the balance of 
                                                          
6 Since 2005.  Source: Competition and Markets Authority: ‘Baseline’ annual report on 
concurrency (April 2014), and archived websites of the Office for Fair Trading and the 
Competition Commission. 
  
7 See Amelia Fletcher: Privatisation, economic regulation and competition in the utilities: Have 
we got the balance right?; Beesley Lecture Series, 14 November 2013; pp 9-10. 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/publications/presentations-and-lectures  
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competition and regulators levers used by sectoral regulators and the competition 
authorities.    
 
Regulation and new investment 
 
We highlighted above some of the notable successes of economic regulation in the 
past decade.  We sometimes forget, or take for granted, how the system of 
independent economic regulation has improved efficiency, quality and choice, for 
consumers, in part through the provision of a stable and predictable environment for 
investors in which risks are understood, commitments are credible, and the cost of 
finance commensurately lower. This is all the more difficult where other pressures – 
often beyond the regulated market itself – have led to upward pressure on prices. It is 
a difficult message, but even where prices have risen – perhaps as a result of the need 
for massive investment to improve service, or to deliver environmental benefits – they 
are still lower than they would otherwise have been without independent economic 
regulation.  There is a danger that we fail to learn from the way regulation has played 
out over the last decade, and miss an opportunity to apply the techniques and lessons 
to new circumstances.  
This is all the more important at a time when plans for renewal and expansion of UK 
infrastructure are becoming more ambitious.  This is in part a response by the 
Government to concerns that underinvestment in infrastructure may constrain future 
economic growth.  
 
The World Economic Forum’s 2013 global rankings for the quality of infrastructure 
suggest that the UK has slipped from 6th to 8th position.8 The Treasury’s National 
Infrastructure Plan points to evidence that this may have constrained GDP growth 
over the last decade.9  
 
On the positive side the UK remains a world-leader in attracting private sector 
investment in infrastructure. A recent study ranked the UK as the No.1 place in the 
world for infrastructure investment.10 Independent economic regulation, has 
contributed to developing a stable, attractive environment for investors. It is a 
framework which global investors are familiar with and understand.  It provides a long 
term view and insulation from political risk, which they value and which benefits 
consumers through lower financing costs.  
 
                                                          
8 World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 
9 HM Treasury: National Infrastructure Plan 2013; December 2013, chapter 2. 
10 Nabarro LLP: Nabarro Infrastructure Index - Attracting Investment 
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The UK Government’s National Infrastructure Plan points to an infrastructure project 
pipeline over the next decades totalling investment of £377 billion at 2012-23 prices.11  
Around £220 bn of this is in the energy sector, and £120 bn in transport, including 
aviation, roads and rail (see chart 5). But there are significant programmes in other 
sectors too.  It includes some of the biggest engineering projects of our age – such as 
the Thames Tideway Tunnel, High Speed 2, and major investments in low-carbon 
energy generation and transmission; as well as increasing airport capacity – though 
the findings of Sir Howard Davies’ Airports Commission are of course not yet factored 
in.  There are also major investments beyond the regulated networks – in the strategic 
roads network and in flood risk management.      
The regulators are of course engaging with government and businesses in the process 
of considering how projects can best be scoped to deliver efficiently benefits for 
consumers and the wider economy; and how they can be funded in a way which 
protects the interests of consumers both today and into the future.    
It is fair to say that a variety of instruments is developing to attract investment to the 
infrastructure pipeline.  Sometimes they make good use of the existing regulatory 
regimes – as in the case of the Thames Tideway Tunnel, enhancing existing rail 
infrastructure, and airport capacity.  Economic regulation will not be the answer to all 
problems in all circumstances.   But, going forward, the economic regulatory tool kit 
may have more to offer, for example in providing an alternative to long-term contracts 
and guarantees and one that provides ongoing, dynamic incentives to deliver services 
and improve efficiency in the best interests of consumers. These are the very the 
problems where independent regulation has a strong track record - with its toolkit of 
efficiency reviews and credible incentives, and scope to evolve to meet new 
challenges.   
We are not attempting to answer this question here.  But with a massive programme 
of investment in the pipeline for the UK, and with increasing concern about efficiency 
and the cumulative cost to consumers, it is in everyone’s interests that we improve 
the understanding of what independent regulation can contribute; where it works 
best; and how it can evolve to get better results for the future. 
 
  
                                                          
11 HM Treasury: National Infrastructure Plan 2013; December 2013 
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Change is good: learning and evolution to drive better 
outcomes 
 
If policy-makers need to (re)learn about the benefits of economic regulation and 
where it can best add value in our economy and society, regulators need to learn too.   
As is apparent from the current policy debate, the continued existence of independent 
economic regulation is not an incontrovertible truth. The legitimacy of economic 
regulation – and the ability therefore of regulators to do their jobs – rests on its ability 
to deliver.  In particular, regulation needs to continue to play, and be seen to play, an 
important role in customers and society getting what they need, want and can afford 
from regulated sectors. This is an important learning point in itself for regulators. It 
also has a number of important implications.   
The first is that regulators need to improve their understanding of what really drives 
the delivery of the outcomes that customers and society experience. This is 
increasingly important as, decades from privatisation, the low hanging fruit has been 
picked from the former state-owned monopolies and the obvious routes to market 
opening and efficiency improvements have been taken.  For the most part, regulators’ 
activities these days are concentrated on more complex and less tractable issues.  To 
maximise our effectiveness and efficiency, and guard against perverse outcomes, we 
must understand the complex matrix of interactions within and between sectors 
which together result in the outcomes experienced by customers and society.  We 
must understand the transmission mechanisms by which the regulatory tool kit 
influences those outcomes, and how this is affected by the wider set of influences on 
company behaviour.  Regulators need to be prepared to work with and through others 
whose influence can complement theirs. And overall, there is a greater premium on 
understanding what works and what doesn’t and why.   
The second implication is that regulators must recognise that relationships matter.  In 
part this is because of their role in delivering outcomes, as noted above. But it is 
increasingly clear that strong, effective relationships – particularly those between 
service providers and customers – have a value in themselves, especially in the 
provision of public services. Customers could be getting an objectively good product, 
with a good level of service at a reasonable price, but if they aren’t kept informed, 
don’t trust that they are getting what they paid for, or don’t know what to do when 
services don’t work as they should, then there is something wrong.   
The third implication is that regulation must evolve, or it will decay. The complex 
systems that ultimately determine the experience of customers and society in 
regulated sectors are constantly changing.  And the expectations of customers and 
society are changing too.  If regulators are to use our tools to maximum effect in 
10 
 
helping to deliver what customers and society expect, then it is clear that the tools we 
use and the way we use them must evolve to be successful.   
On one level, this seems self-evident.  But change in regulated sectors is often 
controversial.  Indeed, we have noted above that one of the successes of independent 
economic regulation has been its creation of a framework that has enabled private 
financing of massive investment in UK infrastructure at low cost, in part because of 
the stability and predictability it provides.   So change needs to be managed carefully, 
and regulators need to devote time and effort to doing it.  There are three key 
elements to this. The first is that there needs to be a clear and compelling case for the 
change; if change is unsettling, then change for change’s sake is scary.  The second is 
that it must be clear what is not changing.  In the case of economic regulation, this is 
about sticking to a clear and consistent articulation of the goals and principles, which 
sit above the use of individual tools.  The third is that there must be ongoing two-way 
communication before, during and after the change.  In this way the regulator can 
build and maintain the trust of those affected, and also maximise the effectiveness of 
the change itself by working with and through others, and building on learning 
through the process.    
So the continued legitimacy of independent economic regulation and its ability to 
provide precisely that stability and predictability that has been a cornerstone of its 
success, requires that it must change.   
 
Learning across sectors: the UK Competition Network and 
the UK Regulators’ Network 
 
We have already talked about the increasing importance of understanding what works 
and what doesn’t and why, the scope to work more collaboratively, and the need to 
ensure we are constantly evolving best practice and applying regulatory and 
competition levers to the advantage of customers and society.  This applies as much – 
if not more – across sectors as within them. Our feeling as regulators is that we need 
to do more together, to pool and share experience and expertise; and to undertake 
specific work on shared problems.   
 
In promoting competition, the advent of the UK Competition Network (UKCN) and of 
the CMA, with additional resource from next year for deployment in sectors where 
regulators have concurrent powers – makes a difference to what we can do.  
Individually most regulators have limited numbers of CA98 cases and market studies, 
and consequently limited specialist capacity.  We’re already seeing joint work across 
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the UKCN between the CMA and regulators – with the reviews of energy markets and 
retail banking being the most high-profile examples.  
In parallel we have launched the UK Regulators’ Network (UKRN) to work on areas of 
common interest.  The Network consists of the UK’s nine economic regulators. It 
mirrors the UK Competition Network, but without the CMA, to avoid potential 
conflicts with their regulatory appeals role. The CMA has observer status at our 
discussions.  
The UKRN is a vehicle for co-operation that supports the separate independent 
regulatory frameworks of the individual regulators. It will allow regulators to work 
closer together on issues of cross-sectoral significance and to learn lessons across 
industries which help to improve regulation and the promotion of competition in 
order to secure better outcomes for consumers.  
The three main objectives of the UKRN are to improve the consistency of economic 
regulation across sectors, deliver efficiency of regulation, and to improve 
understanding of how independent economic regulation works in the interests of 
consumers, society and the economy, identifying scope to do better. 
The members of UKRN are committed to working together to achieve these 
objectives. This commitment includes a programme of joint work on issues of cross-
sectoral significance and applying lessons learned across sectors to improve the 
system of economic regulation. 
The first areas of focus for the UKRN will include understanding what works in 
promoting customer engagement and switching in regulated markets; assessing 
cross-sector resilience and cyber-security and developing a clear understanding of the 
overall affordability of regulated services for consumers. We will also look at our skills 
and labour market across the regulators to see if we can make more of our scarce 
expert resource.   
An important focus for UKRN now is in ensuring that the existence of multiple 
regulatory regimes does not impede investment.  A specific project aims to address 
this, and will produce a handbook for investors, giving a clear explanation of the way 
the UK system works, the roles of the regulators and the significance of regulatory 
independence, recognising that some new investors are less familiar than others with 
the UK framework for reducing political and regulatory risk.  And for the first-time 
investors with cross-sectoral interests will be able to pick up the phone and talk to a 
central point person who can make sure issues are addressed collectively where 
appropriate.  
Correspondingly, and  building on the government’s ‘Principles for Economic 
Regulation’, we will be able to do more to draw lessons across sectors on how 
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government can most effectively work with independent regulators – something 
which in our view has been neglected for too long. 12 
UKRN builds on the previous arrangements for collaboration between regulators, 
which was the Joint Regulators’ Group.  But it is different in three important ways.  
First, it will be led by the Chief Executives of all the member regulators, who will 
provide direction, who will commit resource and who will be accountable for the 
delivery of its expected benefits.  Second, there is dedicated resource for UKRN.  We 
have a small office to coordinate and drive progress, staffed by people from the 
regulators. We also have committed funding from the members, and a further 
commitment to contribute staff for projects as necessary.  Third, there will also be a 
small expert panel to support and challenge our thinking, and our work and the 
challenge will be transparent so people can see what we are up to.   
This is not a world takeover or an attempt to create a “super-regulador”, in the style of 
Spain, Estonia or the Netherlands.13  UKRN does not have any decision-making powers 
or functions in respect of any of the regulated sectors.  UKRN does not compromise 
regulatory independence or the ability of each regulator to make the best judgements 
for its sector.  Regulators’ functions and duties remain as now, with each Chief 
Executive on UKRN accountable separately to his or her own Board.  Beyond the Chief 
Executives, there is no collective oversight, we are separately accountable, as now.  
UKRNs work will be very focussed on maximising the benefits from coordination or 
read across between sectors. We will not do anything which we, as Chief Executives, 
are not willing to take to our Boards and consider acting on.  We will focus on work we 
think is better done together or where we have things to learn from each other, and 
only where we are clear it will have practical impact.  
Conclusion 
Independent economic regulation has delivered a great deal for UK customers and 
society in the decades since privatisation.  It has helped to deliver better service, step 
changes in efficiency, and massive investment in infrastructure.  The economic 
regulator’s tool kit – powers under general competition law and under consumer 
protection law, sectoral regulation of monopoly and sectoral regulation to promote 
competition – is a powerful one.  It has an important role to play in years to come, 
especially taking account the scale of the investment pipeline needed if the 
                                                          
12 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills: ‘Principles for economic regulation’, April 
2011.   
 
13 Global Competition Review: ‘The painful birth of el super regulador’, 17 December 2013.
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expectations of UK customers and society are to be met and the UK economy is to 
grow.   
But we cannot take independent economic regulation for granted.  Regulation needs 
to maintain its legitimacy by helping to deliver what customers and society expect 
from regulated sectors – and being able to demonstrate the value it adds.  While the 
goals and principles of economic regulation remain constant, the way in which 
regulators use their tools will need to evolve.  Regulators need to manage such 
change carefully, building relationships and trust.  And any change must be informed 
by learning – within and across sectors.   
The UKRN provides a great platform to facilitate and promote this learning.  Under 
this umbrella, we are keen to hear from researchers, consumer groups, businesses 
and others to help us all to get a better understanding of the effectiveness of different 
regulatory and competition policy levers; to evaluate regulatory practice; and to assess 
the potential gains from market reform.  We are committed to maximising the 
benefits that economic regulation can bring for the UK economy and society, enabling 
us to assess how economic regulation can best meet future challenges.  
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Annex: charts 
 
Chart 1: Annual average domestic water bills, England and Wales, 1989-2014: average 
bills have risen but are around one-third, or £130, lower because of Ofwat’s efficiency 
challenge.  Bills have remained flat at around £1 a day since 2009.  
 
Source: Ofwat.  November 2013 prices. 
 
Chart 2: Network Rail operating, maintenance and renewals costs; and enhancement 
spending, 2004-05 to 2018-19: under the regulatory regime, improved efficiency has 
freed up funding for network growth and improvement  
 
 
Source: Office of Rail Regulation. 2012-13 prices. 
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Chart 3: Privatisation: the expected story 
 
Source: Amelia Fletcher: Privatisation, economic regulation and competition in the 
utilities: Have we got the balance right?; Beesley Lecture Series, 14 November 2013  
 
 
Chart 4: Regulation: a changing focus 
 
Source: Amelia Fletcher: Privatisation, economic regulation and competition in the 
utilities: Have we got the balance right?; Beesley Lecture Series, 14 November 2013  
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Chart 5:  Projected infrastructure investment, by sector, 2012-13 prices 
 
 
Source:  HM Treasury: National Infrastructure Plan 2013; December 2013  
  
 
Chart 6:  UK Regulation Network – organisation
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Chart 7: UK Regulators’ Network: Project governance and delivery 
 
 
